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1 Introduction
The positive role of trade financing in facilitating international trade is ubiquitously agreed and
confirmed by researchers (e.g. Chor and Manova, 2012; Manova, 2013). Nevertheless, the impact of
trade financing provided by national export credit agencies (ECAs) is much less in the clear. While
one camp advocates ECA financing and endorses its positive effect on a country’s exports and jobs,
the other camp doubts the efficiency of this non-market intervention and raises concern about the
unintended distortions brought about by such government interventions.1 In the US, this debate
reached its climax when its Export-Import Bank (EXIM), the official export credit agency (ECA) of
the country, closed to new business after June 30, 2015.2 Despite the sharp controversy around the
functions of the EXIM Bank, surprisingly no systematic evidence exists in the academic literature
regarding the effectiveness of the US EXIM Bank in promoting trade.
In this paper, we attempt to steer this debate into clarity by investigating whether and how – if
any – support (in the form of authorizations) provided by the US EXIM Bank affects US exports.
We try to uncover the heterogeneity under this potential export-promoting effect of EXIM authoriza-
tion across various dimensions including industries, regions, and size of American companies that
received EXIM support.3 We then move on to examining whether the potential export-promoting
effect of EXIM authorization is affected by competition from other countries’ ECA-financed export-
ing activities particularly in the wake of international institutional arrangements such as the OECD
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the Arrangement hereafter).
Using panel data on US export flows disaggregated by receiving country, industry, and year,
our first set of results provide no detectable evidence on the export-promoting effects of EXIM au-
thorization. However, further inspection reveals that this insignificant effect masks heterogeneities:
EXIM authorizations to all sectors, except for aerospace products and parts (NAICS 3364), have a
significantly positive, albeit small effect on US exports, and that this effect is only observable for
American companies that are not classified as small by the Bank.4 Furthermore, we find that the
positive average export-promoting effect of EXIM authorization is not affected by competition from
exporting activities financed by foreign governments’ ECAs, and that this effect is neither affected
by foreign governments’ accession to the Arrangement nor by the size of American companies that
received EXIM assistance. In addition, the general ineffectiveness of EXIM authorization is robust
when taking into account the heterogeneity with an industry’s position in the value chain, and when
accounting for the possibility of influences that may spill over across sectors.
The above results have important policy implications for policymakers in the US as well as in
other countries. Our research highlights the importance of going beyond evaluating a general export-
1See James (2011) for a review of the viewpoints of both camps.
2On December 4, 2015, the Bank was reauthorized by the Congress for business as usual.
3We look at these dimensions because of its explicit focus in the US EXIM Bank Charter.
4The US EXIM Bank adopts the qualifying criteria for “small business” from the U.S. Small Business Administration
(SBA) definition. SBA has established a “Table for Small Business Size Standards” for industries in the North American
Industry Classification System, where the size standards are based on either annual sales or average employment. The latest
table updated on February 26, 2016 can be accessed from the SBA website at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/
files/files/Size Standards Table.pdf.
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promoting effect of ECA financing, and exploring the heterogeneity behind this general effect that is
related to country and industry characteristics. It calls attention to the significance of ECAs in offset-
ting competition from other countries’ ECA-financed exporting activities. Consequently, it revives
the political debate on whether resorting to domestic institutions is the answer to improving trade
competitiveness without leading to protectionism and market distortions (domestically and interna-
tionally. It also rekindles the debate on countries’ binding constraints under various international
institutional arrangements, and the countering effect on countries’ international commitments as a
result of their accession to these arrangements.
Our analysis extends the existing studies that establish a positive and significant impact of ECA
financing on ECA country exports. In a pioneering study, Egger and Url (2006) analyze Austrian
export flows disaggregated by receiving country and 2-digit industry, and show that export credit
guarantees extended by Austria’s ECA, Oesterreichische Kontrollbank (OeKB), indeed foster eco-
nomic activity, resulting in a multiplier effect of 2.8. Furthermore, OeKB financing not only results
in the broadening of trade partners towards high-risk regions but also leaves the goods structure of
foreign trade almost unchanged. Moser et al. (2008) analyze German export flows, disaggregated by
receiving country and year, and show that export credit guarantees extended by Germany’s official
ECA, Euler Hermes (Hermes), do lead to higher German exports with a multiplier effect of about 1.7.
The effectiveness of ECA financing crucially hinges on both the sample of countries and the time pe-
riod considered. Both studies above show a more than proportional effect of export credit guarantees
on export volumes with short-run effects of ECA financing on export volumes being smaller than
long-run effects. This is argued to be largely because of the lag between the day when a guarantee is
authorized and the actual shipment of the good.
In a similar vein, Felbermayr and Yalcin (2013) study German export flows disaggregated also
by receiving country and 2-digit industry, and document that a 1% increase in export credit guaran-
tees extended by Hermes, boosts exports on average by about 0.012%. Moreover, they show that
the effectiveness of Hermes in increasing exports varies across sectors, regions and income groups.
In particular, Hermes effect is large in a small number of sectors which are aviation, shipbuilding
and transportation sector. Characterized by high time-to-build lags and large external financial de-
pendence, these sectors indicate that Hermes’ guarantees alleviate sectoral financial frictions. Lastly,
they show that Hermes does not play a strong role in reducing the impact of financial frictions in im-
porting countries on German exports. Likewise, the positive Hermes effect becomes smaller for less
vulnerable sectors in terms of credit constraints. Additionally, they show that Hermes have helped
contain export collapse during the recent financial crisis of 2008, particularly in sectors with higher
credit constraints. At a more disaggregated level, Badinger and Url (2013) analyze a cross-section
of 178 firms for the year 2008, and show that export credit guarantees extended by OeKB increase
firm-exports from some 80% to 100%. More so, the effect of export credit guarantees is larger for
exports to countries with higher credit risk. The generally positive pro-trade impact of trade credits
is confirmed in some other studies with data collected either from Berne Union or individual export
credit insurer (van der Veer, 2015; Korinek et al., 2010; Auboin and Engemann, 2014).
Our study is also broadly related to the literature which shows that negative shocks to bank-
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intermediated trade finance, particularly at times of financial distress at the banks, reduce the volume
of exports for firms that continue exporting to a given product-destination market (i.e. intensive
margin), and have no impact on the probability that a firm exists or enters new product or destina-
tion markets (i.e. extensive margin) (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Paravisini et al., 2014; Prete and
Federico, 2014). They argue that lack in bank-intermediated trade finance reduces exports through
raising the variable cost of production rather than the sunk cost of entry investments.
Last, our research is linked to an increasing body of literature on the impact of trade finance on
a country’ level and pattern of international trade, both at the macro- and micro- level (e.g. Chor
and Manova, 2012; Manova, 2013; Manova et al., 2015). This line of research argues that financial
comparative advantage alleviates the substantial sunk, fixed, and variable costs of trade such that
financially developed economies export more, especially in financially vulnerable sectors, through
entering more markets, shipping more products to each destination, and selling more of each product.
While our empirical approach is closed related to Egger and Url (2006), Moser et al. (2008),
and Felbermayr and Yalcin (2013), we make several distinctive extensions and contributions to this
growing body of literature. First, to the best of our knowledge about the academic literature, we
provide the first rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of US EXIM Bank, a dominant player in
the world EXIM financing. Second, this is the first paper that provides evidence on whether EXIM
authorization enables domestic exporters to overcome the competition emanating from foreign gov-
ernment ECA financing, particularly in cases where foreign government ECAs are acceded to the
OECD Arrangement. Finally, we investigate whether and how EXIM financing enables exporters to
move up the industrial chain and evolve itself in the global value chain, offering the first evidence of
its kind in the context of global production networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the conceptual framework elab-
orating the possible channels and directions in which ECA financing would affect aggregate exports.
Section 3 proposes an empirical gravity model for the estimation of the effect of EXIM support. Sec-
tion 4 provides an institutional background on the US EXIM Bank. Section 5 describes the data and
offers descriptive evidence. Section 6 presents our results and analysis of the possible influencing
channels. Section 7 concludes this paper with a discussion on the limitations and possibilities of
future research.
2 Conceptual Framework
To export is not cost free. It requires substantial upfront costs in the form of sunk, fixed, and
variable costs. While export-related sunk and fixed costs could include learning about the prof-
itability of potential export markets, making market-specific investments in capacity/product cus-
tomization/regulatory compliance, and setting up and maintaining foreign distribution networks,
variable costs could include shipping, duties and freight insurance, and any variable production costs
(Manova, 2013). These costs have to be incurred before the export revenues are realized where the
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realization can be deferred because of potential delays in cross-border shipping and delivery.5
Owing to the risks6 associated with the realization of export revenues and yet the financial need
to provide for export-related costs tied to and in support of international trade transactions, firms
prefer financing through an active trade finance market to utilizing their retained earnings or inter-
national cash flows from operations. This preference is evident in the fact that 80% to 90% of trade
transactions involve some credit, insurance or guarantee, from various players including multilat-
eral financial institutions, regional development banks, ECAs, and commercial institutions (Auboin,
2009b).7 While private banks account for some 80% of the trade finance market through lending
(Auboin, 2009b), ECAs are now becoming ever more popular in this market, largely due to the
changing role played by ECAs in trade finance: from being lenders/insurers of last resort8, to per-
forming secondary market operations in the form of securitization or refinancing guarantees9, and to
being a public interventionist especially in times of crisis10, among others. In a survey conducted
by the International Chamber of Commerce, only 6.5% of the bank respondents agree that ECAs do
not help in narrowing trade finance gaps with the remaining 93.5% agreeing at various levels: 18.5%
agreeing that they help ‘very little’, 46.7% agreeing that they help ‘somewhat’, and 28.3% agreeing
that they help ‘to a great extent’ (ICC, 2016). ECAs silently assumes risk in the trade finance markets
and thereby provide necessary protection in various forms of financial support.
Despite the importance of ECAs in the trade finance market, its implications on country-level
exports continues to remain a conundrum.11 Does ECA-financing have a positive, negative, or no
impact on country exports? If yes, then what are the potential channels through which these effects
are mediated?
Existing research including Egger and Url (2006), Moser et al. (2008), and Felbermayr and
Yalcin (2013) provide evidence on the positive impact of Austrian and German ECAs have had on
5Potential delays in cross-border shipping and delivery could be for a number of reasons including port handling,
customs clearances, border compliance, and documentary compliance, among others. Manova (2013) reports that typically,
cross-border shipping and delivery take 60 days longer to complete than domestic orders.
6Risks here could be commercial where one of the parties involved is unable to fulfill its part of the contract. For
instance, on the one hand, an exporter may not be able to secure payments for his merchandise in case of bankruptcy
or insolvency of the importer or rejection by the importer. On the other hand, the importer bears the risk of alteration
or delayed delivery of goods. Besides commercial risk, traders further have to deal with exchange rate fluctuation risk,
country risk, transportation risk, and political risk (Auboin and Meier-Ewert, 2003).
7See Auboin and Meier-Ewert (2003) for a list of traditional actors and instruments of a trade finance market.
8The US EXIM Bank is one such example where the Bank acts as a lender/insurer of last resort for credit-worthy
foreign importers of US goods and services.
9For instance, the German ECA (Euler-Hermes) provides for a securitization guarantee scheme under the
name “Verbriefungsgarantie, details of which can be found at http://www.agaportal.de/en/aga/produkte/
verbriefungsgarantie.html. For more details on securitization and refinancing guarantees scheme see ISMED (2011).
10The financial crisis of 2008 witnessed the bulk of the support provided by ECAs essentially with programs for short-
term lending of working capital and credit guarantees aimed at SMEs. While for certain countries the commitment is
very large (German and Japan), for other countries very large lines of credit have been granted to secure supplies with
key trading partners (Auboin, 2009a). For instance, the US and China agreed that their respective ECAs would make
an additional US$20 billion available for bilateral trade, and the US and South Korea made a similar commitment for
US$3 billion (https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/coher e/challenges e.htm). Efforts of government-back
institutions heightened due to estimated market gap to be around US$25 billion which private sector was unable to provide
for.
11For simplicity, in our discussion, we assume that all firms in the economic system are eligible for ECA financing, and
that firm characteristics such as firm size, firm productivity, amongst others, which could have an impact on the demand
for ECA financin, are assumed away.
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these countries’ exports respectively. They postulate that ECA financing reduces profit uncertainty
on the exporter’s side stemming from the default risk on the importer’s side. Reduction in uncertainty
and risks, therefore, encourages exporters to engage in greater cross-border trading activities thereby
increasing country exports (Moser et al., 2008).
Risk mitigation being one channel, ECAs also have a positive impact on home-country exports
through the liquidity channel. ECAs provide its home-country exporters with liquidity that enables
them to overcome their continuous need of export-related costs, and offer foreign importers fluidity to
pay for home country products or services. By ensuring liquidity, ECAs help its country’s exporters
enter into the competitive international markets with both products and financing, encouraging home-
country exports. Note that the risk mitigation and liquidity channels may not necessarily operate
in silos and move in tandem. For instance, exporters with an ECA-issued export credit insurance
not only insure themselves against delay/default of their foreign receivables (risk channel) but can
also get financing from their banks by borrowing against the insurance policy (liquidity channel).12
Likewise, being financed by an ECA-backed direct loan not only ensures exporters/importers of
enhanced fluidity (liquidity channel) but also, by transferring importers’ debt obligation incurred in
the purchase of ECA country’s exports, protects exporters against defaulting importers or delayed
import payments as well as provides flexibility to the importer in repaying the loan which further
reduces the risk of default on repayment (risk channel). Alternatively, by assuming credit risk of
private-financiers (risk channel) through refinancing guarantees or securitization, ECAs facilitate
private financiers access to the funds they need for granting export credit that could then be passed
on to the borrower (liquidity channel). Therefore, by responding to risk and inadequate liquidity in
the trade finance market through various instruments, ECAs encourage its home country’s exports.13
The magnitude of the potential positive impact of ECA financing on country exports, however,
depends on a host of factors. For instance, destinations with a higher degree of information barriers
and insecurity should benefit more strongly from ECA financing, independently of the industry struc-
ture (Egger and Url, 2006). Besides, industries that produce capital goods which are sophisticated,
expensive, and involve long lead times with complex supply chains; and/or industries that demand
a greater external financial dependence because of continuous investments requirements, large ges-
tation periods, longer cash harvest periods, high R&D, or high working capital, should benefit more
strongly from ECA financing, particularly in counter-cyclical periods. This is because if demand
dries up as a result of a financial failure or other types of globalization shock, there is a risk that the
production losses will be permanent.14 In such cases, ECAs provide with necessary trade finance
thereby preventing export and trade flow declines.
While ECAs’ ability to complement risk with liquidity cannot be refuted, there are also a number
12Payment default/delay can happen for a number of reasons such as the borrower becoming insolvent, adverse measures
taken by foreign governments or warlike events arise, among others.
13While there appears to be no literature that attempts to identify when and which form of ECA-backed trade financing
instruments is used, there are such studies on bank-intermediated trade finance instruments (see Auboin and Engemann
(2013) for a review).
14http://www.exim.gov/news/archives/speeches/us-exports-competitiveness-and-export-import-
bank-united-states.
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of factors which may eliminate or even reverse any export-enhancing benefits of ECA financing.15
For instance, because of government mandate or strategic objective ECAs may reallocate capital that
would have been put into other uses.16 Unless reallocation of resources addresses market failure,
economic efficiency may be lost. By taking resources from general economic uses and putting them
to less-efficient uses, the bank creates distortions in the economy and imposes opportunity costs that
are probably higher than the value-added generated from ECA intervention. Besides, ECAs may un-
derstate the economic costs of export financing by assuming that they have special insights or access
to information which private financiers do not have and hence are in a better position to evaluate
the creditworthiness of a transaction.17 As a result, ECAs may miscalculate the risk associated in
cross-border activities, create a systematic bias for ECA financing, and crowd out private financiers
who would be better able to lend on terms that reflect the market value and risk of projects. At best,
distortive allocations may not generate additional exports as expected; at worst, the mercantilistic
interventionism by ECAs may actually reduce exports.
It can therefore be derived that while ECA financing can affect aggregate exports via its impact on
the cost to trade or the demand for ECA country’s exports, the actual net effect is subject to empirical
findings. In what follows, we use a modified gravity model to estimate the reduced-form net effect
of ECA financing, and the estimation stands open to empirical irregularities which may influence the
effect in various ways.
3 Empirical Methodology
Based on the theoretical underpinning of the gravity model of trade (e.g. Anderson and van Win-
coop, 2003), market clearance and general equilibrium imply that bilateral trade between countries
can be expressed as
Xijkt = e
f(Sjkt)Ejkt
(
Yikt
Ykt
)(
τijkt
PiktPjkt
)1−σk
, (1)
where exports of good k from country i to country j in year t, Xijkt, depend on a range of factors:
country j’s expenditure on k in t, Ejkt; an adjustment factor ef(·) which is a function of US EXIM
support Sjkt for importing country j on sector k in year t; the share of country i in the world pro-
duction of k in t, YiktYkt ; bilateral trade costs τijkt; and multilateral resistance terms PiktPjkt. The
parameter σk, which is assumed to be greater than one, is the elasticity of substitution specific to
good k and common across countries. Note that the adjustment factor ef(·) broadly accommodates
the aforementioned various influencing channels of EXIM financing on exports, and is thus intended
to capture the reduced-form net effect of US EXIM support.
15The understanding of potential drawback of ECA intervention has been drawn from James (2011).
16The US EXIM Bank is one such example where congressional mandate/strategic objective may govern or define its
credit authorization portfolio.
17Vanessa Weaver, a member of the Board of Directors of the US EXIM Bank, was quoted saying that while private
financial institutions do not have enough information to assess which transactions are creditworthy, the Bank personnel
can go in to a minister of finance or the president of a company and ask for accounting records that are audited under IAS
rules thereby ensuring the required push for reforms and the kind of structures that are needed. See Weaver (2002).
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Taking natural logarithms of the both sides of (1) and setting i = US gives
lnXUSjkt = f(Sjkt) + lnEjkt + ln
(
Y USkt
Ykt
)
+ (1− σk)[ln τUSjkt − (lnPUSkt + lnPjkt)]. (2)
A challenge in practice with the estimation of the above specification is that it is difficult to find
data for all the variables Ejkt,
Y USkt
Ykt
, τUSjkt , P
US
kt , and Pjkt that are time variant for disaggregated
industries (NAICS4 level).18 To overcome this difficulty, we make assumptions that the values of
Ejkt and
Y USkt
Ykt
are time functions of their base-year values, and the variables τUSjkt , P
US
kt , and Pjkt are
proportional to their country-level counterparts with the proportions remaining stable over time:
Ejkt ≡ eδtEjk,
Y USkt /Ykt ≡ eθtY USk /Yk,
τUSjkt ≡ eλkτUSjt ,
PUSkt ≡ eγkPUSt ,
Pjkt ≡ eµkPjt. (3)
Now inserting (3) into (2) and further assuming the linearity of f(·) (i.e. f(Sjkt) = αSjkt) and
the constancy of the elasticity of substitution between all goods (i.e. σk = σ), we have
lnXUSjkt = αSjkt + lnEjk + ln
(
Y USk
Yk
)
+ (1− σ)[ln τUSjt − (lnPUSt + lnPjt)]
+ δt + θt + (1− σ)(λjk − γk − µk). (4)
Merging overlapping parameters, we have the following equation for empirical estimation:
lnXUSjkt = αSjkt + (1− σ)[ln τUSjt − (lnPUSt + lnPjt)]
+ φt + ηjk + ZjktΓ + jkt, (5)
where the vector Zjkt contains additional controls, φt captures all unobserved time-specific factors,
ηjk absorbs all country-industry-specific factors including the time-invariant variable Ejk, and the
error term jkt represents the white noise of the model.
As the standard practice in the empirical gravity literature, we assume bilateral trade costs τUSj,t
to be a function of a number of geographical, cultural, and institutional factors:
τUSjt ≡ exp(ρ1distUSj + ρ2langUSj + ρ3contigUSj + ρ4legUSj + ρ5currUSj + ρ6colUSj
+ρ7wto
US
jt + ρ8rta
US
jt ), (6)
where distUSj is the logged geographical distance between country j and the US weighted by the
18Despite a large number of missing records, the UN-INDSTAT database provides data on industrial output for 2-digit
ISIC sectors of many countries, but not on price. The same applies to OECE-STAN database which covers even less
countries. Data on country-industry-year specific demand is also unavailable.
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population of countries, langUSj is a dummy which takes on the value of one if country j has the
same official language (i.e. English) as the US and zero otherwise, contigUSj is a dummy for sharing
the border with the US, legUSj is a dummy for having the same legal origin as the US, curr
US
j is a
dummy for sharing the same official currency (i.e. the US dollar) as the US, wtoUSjt the dummy for
the partner country being a member of GATT/WTO as is the US, and rtaUSjt the dummy for being in
a common regional free trade agreement with the US.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and Berger et al. (2013), the multilateral resistance terms,
lnPUSt +lnPjt, are approximated by a first-order log-linear expansion of the nonlinear price equation
system in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Specifically, it is shown that under the assumption of
symmetry of bilateral trade costs, the multilateral resistance terms can be expressed as GDP-weighted
average trade costs:
lnPUSt + lnPjt =
N∑
l=1
ωl,t ln τj,l,t +
N∑
l=1
ωlt ln τ
US
lt +
N∑
l=1
N∑
m=1
ωltωmt ln τkmt, (7)
where ωlt ≡ Ylt/Yt is the share of country l in world GDP.
Plugging (6) into (7) gives a function of the multilateral resistance terms as a linear combination
of observable components of trade costs as in (6):
lnPUSt + lnPj,t = ρ1Q
dist
j + ρ2Q
lang
j + ρ3Q
contig
j + ρ4Q
leg
j + ρ5Q
curr
j + ρ6Q
col
j
+ρ7Q
wto
jt + ρ8Q
rta
jt , (8)
where
Qsj ≡
N∑
l=1
ωltsjl +
N∑
l=1
ωlts
US
l +
N∑
l=1
N∑
m=1
ωltωmtskm,
for s = dist, lang, contig, leg, curr, col
Qsjt ≡
N∑
l=1
ωltsjlt +
N∑
l=1
ωlts
US
lt +
N∑
l=1
N∑
m=1
ωl,tωmtskmt, for s = wto, rta.
Therefore we can now control for trade costs and multilateral resistance terms jointly using the same
set of observable variables:
ln τUSj,t − (lnPUSt + lnPj,t) = ρ1(distUSj −Qdistj ) + ρ2(langUSj −Qlangj )
+ρ3(contig
US
j −Qcontigj ) + ρ4(legUSj −Qlegj )
+ρ5(curr
US
j −Qcurrj ) + ρ6(colUSj −Qcolj )
+ρ7(wto
US
jt −Qwtojt ) + ρ8(rtaUSjt −Qrtajt ). (9)
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4 Background of the US EXIM Bank
Founded in 1934, the US EXIM Bank is the official export credit agency of the United States.
It operates as an independent, self-sustaining, and wholly owned corporation of the US government.
Its mission is to create and sustain US jobs by financing and facilitating the exports of US goods
and services, providing competitive export financing, and ensuring a level playing field for US goods
and services in the global marketplace. The Bank in exercising its functions, supplements and en-
courages, and not competes, with private financiers. As a matter of fact, the Bank is encouraged to
consider the need to involve private financiers while determining whether to provide support for a
transaction. This is evident in the fact that about 98% of the Bank’s transactions include a partnering
private financial entity (US EXIM Bank, 2014). While the Bank assumes credit and country risk that
private financiers are unwilling or unable to accept by providing financing at terms competitive with
foreign ECAs, it must balance this risk by ensuring reasonable assurance of repayment for its credit
authorization.19
Given congressional mandate or its own strategic objective, the Bank supports certain types of
exports. For instance, on the one hand, the Bank is mandated to make available not less than 25% of
its authorized capital to small and medium enterprises, and at the same time it must promote greater
financing to projects that focus on renewable energy and sub-Saharan African region.20 On the other
hand, the Bank also strategically provides competitive financing to certain industries perceived with
high potential for US export growth which comprise of agribusiness, aircraft and avionics, satellites,
mining, oil and gas development, and power generation involving renewable energy. Besides indus-
tries, the Bank strategically targets nine key markets which it identifies as high potential emerging
economies: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Turkey, South Africa, Nigeria, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam
(US EXIM Bank, 2013b).
Internationally, the Bank abides by the disciplines laid out under the OECD Arrangement on
Officially Supported Export Credits.21 The Arrangement is a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” negotiated
by the participants to the Arrangement.22
19Section 2(b)(1)(B), the Charter of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (the Charter hereafter), updated Febru-
ary 29, 2016.
20The Bank does not have a quantitative target to promote the exports of goods and services related to renewable energy
sources, and to promote financing to sub-Saharan Africa. See in the Charter Section 2(b)(1)(E)(v) for small business,
Section 2(b)(1)(K) for renewable energy, and Section 2(b)(9)(A) for Sub-Saharan Africa.
21The main purpose of the Arrangement is to provide a framework for the orderly use of government-backed export
financing (within the participating countries), with the goal of encouraging competition among exporters based on quality
and price of goods and services rather than on the most favorable government-backed financing terms and conditions. The
financing terms and conditions could be related to minimum interest rates, risk fees, and maximum repayment terms. The
OECD views the Arrangement as “rules” defining constraints on members’ lending activity.
22The participants to the OECD Arrangement currently are: Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, South Korea, New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States (for the purpose of this paper, countries in the EU are taken from
https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea.). Brazil is a participant to the Sector Undertaking On Export Credits For Civil Aircraft.
Information on participating countries has been gathered from the Agreement on Officially Supported Export Credits,
February 1, 2016, TAD/PG(2016)1.
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5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The US EXIM support data used in this study is drawn from the annual accounting reports of
the Bank which is made available under the Open Government Directive.23 It contains transactional
information on all authorizations that has been approved or denied by the EXIM Board of Direc-
tors from 2007 through 2013.24 Transactional information includes authorized amount that has been
approved including approved amount to assist small American businesses, financing program (di-
rect loans, loan guarantees or export credit insurance), industry classification of the product (6-digit
NAICS or 4-digit SIC code), country of the foreign buyer, among others.
To address our research question, we map the Bank’s transactional data to the US exports data
extracted from UN COMTRADE.25 Using concordances from US Census Bureau and US Bureau
of Economic Analysis, we aggregate the industry classification to 4-digit IO/NAICS sectors. After
cleaning the data, our sample comprises of 148,708 observations resulting from a three dimensional
panel of 226 countries, 94 industries, and 7 years spanning from 2007 to 2013. On the one hand,
only 11% of the country-industry-year observations records no imports from the US. The remaining
89% have imports from the US at least once across all the 7 years, 62% imported from the US for all
7 years in the dataset. On the other hand, 96% of the country-industry-year observations received no
EXIM authorization. The remaining 4% report to having been authorized by the Bank at least once
across the 7 years, while only 0.13% report to having been authorized by the Bank for all the years
in the sample period.
Figure 1 reveals, at both country and industry levels, a positive correlation between the total value
of the Bank’s authorization portfolio and US exports, thus backing the Bank’s assertion of supporting
American exporters by equipping them with financing tools necessary to compete for global sales.
Nevertheless, Tables 1 and 2 reveal the skewed distribution of EXIM authorization across coun-
tries and industries where the Bank does not necessarily authorize its available funds to those coun-
tries and industries that dominate US exports. For instance, India received a maximum 10.96% share
of the Bank’s portfolio followed by Saudi Arabia at 10.55%. However, total exports to India and
Saudi Arabia accounted for only 1.46% and 1.08% share of total US exports as against the maximum
20.76% share of total US exports to Canada who received only 1.60% share in the Bank’s portfolio.
In a similar vein, while aerospace products and parts (NAICS 3364) received a maximum 49.09%
share of the Bank’s portfolio, its exports accounted for only 2.19% of total US exports as opposed to
the maximum 6.22% share of petroleum and coal products (NAICS 3240) exports that received only
23Data can be accessed at http://www.exim.gov/open-government-directive.
24The dataset reports only 2 transactions, one from each fiscal year 2012 and 2013, where the EXIM Board of Directors
denied authorization. The two transactions amounted to US$61,465,615 representing a mere 0.11% of the total authoriza-
tions approved for the fiscal year 2012 and 2013. We exclude the two denied transactions from the dataset. The resulting
dataset used in the paper comprises of all authorizations approved by the EXIM Board of Directors from 2007 through
2013.
25The Bank’s transactional data fail to provide information on US exports. We, therefore, use available information on
the country of foreign buyer, industry classification of the product, and the year of authorization, to aggregate transactions
at the country-industry-time level. Much of the transactional information is lost in the process of transforming disaggre-
gated transaction level data to aggregated country-industry-time level data. To the transformed country-industry-time level
dataset, we then append the US exports data from UN COMTRADE.
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Fig. 1. US EXIM authorization and US exports by country and industry. The left panel shows the correlation
between the log values of US exports and US EXIM authorization, both in US$ and taken as averages of the
period 2007-2013, for all country destinations. The right panel shows the correlation between the log values
of US exports and US EXIM authorization, both in US$ and taken as averages of the period 2007-2013, for
all US 4-digit NAICS industries. The solid straight lines are the fitted linear trends, and the surrounding
dashed lines give the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated linear trends.
0.06% share in the Bank’s authorization.
Table 3 shows that there is a negative correlation between what the Bank authorizes to a region in
total and what it authorizes to small businesses for that particular region. For instance, for the period
2007 through 2013, Asian region received the highest share in the Bank’s total authorization portfolio
of loans, guarantees and insurance at 34.4%, of which only 2% was authorized to small businesses.
On the contrary, for the same period, Caribbean region received the lowest share in the Bank’s total
authorization portfolio at 1.1%, of which, however, 24.7% was authorized to small businesses. It
should be noted that on a global scale the Bank’s authorization to small businesses ranges from 5%
to 11% for the period 2007 through 2013, which is well below the mandated authorization to small
businesses at 20%.26
The definitions and summary statistics of the main variables of this research are contained in
Table 4. Not surprisingly, the variables for exports and EXIM authorizations have large standard
deviations relative to their means as a result of the highly skewed distributions as seen from above.
The gravity variables contain sufficient variations representing a wide spectrum of characteristics
of US trade partners in the data. The four standardized foreign ECA competition measures show
varying degrees of ECA competition US exporters face in foreign markets (see Section 6.3 for the
details about the construction of these measures).
26 See Section 635(b)(1)(E)(v) of the US Code Title 12 “Banks and Banking”. Note that this threshold was raised to
25% in December 2015; see Section 2(b)(1)(E)(v), the Charter.
12
Table 1. Top 20 US EXIM supported destinations and US export markets
(A) US EXIM support recipients (B) US export destinations
Name Share (%) Name Share (%)
India 10.96 Canada 20.76
Saudi Arabia 10.55 Mexico 14.08
Mexico 8.39 China 6.39
United Arab Emirates 6.25 Japan 4.84
Turkey 5.37 Germany 3.55
Ireland 4.96 United Kingdom 3.44
Rep. of Korea 4.73 Netherlands 3.03
China, Hong Kong SAR 4.40 Rep. of Korea 2.86
Indonesia 3.62 Brazil 2.64
Brazil 3.29 Belgium 2.21
China 3.28 China, Hong Kong SAR 2.21
Ethiopia 2.96 Singapore 2.10
Singapore 2.81 France 1.86
Russian Federation 1.95 Australia 1.81
Chile 1.78 Switzerland 1.48
Germany 1.61 India 1.46
Canada 1.60 Italy 1.12
United Kingdom 1.49 United Arab Emirates 1.10
Israel 1.46 Saudi Arabia 1.08
Netherlands 1.34 Colombia 1.04
Note. This table reports the top 20 markets, ranked by their shares in US total EXIM authorization and exports (2007-2013)
respectively.
Table 2. Top 20 US EXIM supported industries and US export industries
(A) US EXIM support industries (B) US export industries
Name Share (%) Name Share (%)
Aerospace products 49.09 Petroleum and coal products 6.22
Engines and turbines 7.86 Agriculture and construction mach. 5.84
Agriculture and construction mach. 7.65 Motor vehicles 5.07
Boilers, tanks, and shipping containers 7.62 Electronic components 4.68
Communications equipment 6.02 Pharmaceuticals and medicines 4.64
Other general purpose mach. 5.23 Basic chemicals 4.27
Industrial machinery 3.72 Computer equipment 3.38
Motor vehicles 3.27 Misc, manufactured commodities 3.29
Railroad rolling stock 2.95 Oilseeds and grains 3.21
Electronic components 0.7 Nonferrous metal 3.15
Wood products 0.54 Electronic instruments 3.12
Oilseeds and grains 0.44 Engines and turbines 3.11
Metalworking machinery 0.35 Resin, rubber, and artificial fibers 2.98
Electronic instruments 0.34 Communications equipment 2.64
Misc. manufactured commodities 0.32 Other general purpose mach. 2.52
Oil and gas extraction 0.32 Medical equipment and supplies 2.51
Other agricultural products 0.29 Aerospace products and parts 2.19
Commercial and service mach. 0.29 Other fabricated metal products 2.01
Other electrical equipment 0.24 Electrical equipment 1.69
Basic chemicals 0.22 Motor vehicle parts 1.68
Note. This table reports the top 20 industries (4-digit NAICS), ranked by their shares in US total EXIM authorization and
exports (2007-2013) respectively.
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6 Results
6.1 Baseline results
We now turn to our formal regression analysis, looking into the estimated results of eq. (5) in
various forms. Note that since our data is rectangularized (i.e. expanded so that all possible country-
industry-year combinations exist) to facilitate gravity analysis, a great number of zeros are created.
In our baseline regressions, we adopt three approaches to address the issue of the excessive number
of zeros. First, we follow the common practice of adding one US dollar to both export and EXIM
authorization values before taking logs so that all observations are kept in log transformation. Sec-
ond, we replace the continuous EXIM authorization measure with an EXIM authorization indicator
which takes on the value of one if a country-industry-year observation receives positive EXIM autho-
rization and zero otherwise, which allows us to estimate the effect of receiving any positive EXIM
authorization as a whole. Third, reported in Appendix A we use Poisson estimations to avoid adding
one to the dependent variable (i.e. exports) as suggested by (e.g. Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).27
A potential bias in the estimation comes from the “selection” of projects due to the congressional
mandate or strategic financing objective. In particular, if firm size is positively correlated with exports
(e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1995), congressional mandate to provide a proportion of EXIM authorized
capital to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) could lead to a downward bias in the estimated
EXIM effect. To address this concern, first we control for the employment share of SMEs in each
NAICS industry using data from the US Census Bureau.28 Second, the inclusion of country-industry
fixed effects ensures that any influences from unobserved factors specific at these levels are ruled
out, in particular those factors, such as geopolitical preference, that would affect the country-industry
preferences in EXIM financing decisions. Lastly, by introducing time dummies, time effects common
to all industries and markets are netted out.
The baseline results are reported in Table 5. We find that the coefficient on the contemporaneous
EXIM authorization variable, whether continuous or binary, is negative but statistically insignificant
from zero when stronger specifications of fixed effects (country-industry fixed effects) are imposed
in columns 2-3 and 5-6. This implies that in a given year, EXIM authorizations do not have a
sizable impact on US exports with its partner countries. The sign and magnitude of the estimated
elasticity of EXIM authorizations with respect to US exports stand in contrast to the positive and
significant estimates found by Egger and Url (2006) for Austria, Moser et al. (2008) and Felbermayr
and Yalcin (2013) for Germany, with magnitude in the range of 0.04-0.66.29 We also conduct Poisson
regressions and experiment on the baseline specifications using the subsample of positive EXIM
27We only do this for the baseline specifications as the implementation of Poisson estimation on fuller models with many
dummies requires extraordinarily large computational power which is beyond an ordinary workstation capacity.
28We also try including the share of SMEs in the total number of firms in each NAICS industry, and the results remain
almost identical. In addition, the exclusion of these SME share measures also does not impact the conclusions.
29In the view of the fact that differences in the export-promoting effects of German and Austrian ECAs could be for a
number of reasons such as differences in management and operations, products and facilities they offer, to name a few,
and that Egger and Url (2006), Moser et al. (2008) and Felbermayr and Yalcin (2013) do not explicitly attribute their
results to any such specific factor, reference to their estimated impact is only representational and not comparative. Also
see International Financial Consulting Ltd. (2012) and Hecker (1997) on differences across ECAs that make it difficult to
compare the same.
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authorization observations only. Estimates shown in Table A1, Appendix A, are qualitatively in line
with the above findings. For the ease of interpretation of elasticities, our preferred estimates in the
rest of the analysis remain to be the continuous EXIM authorization variable.
Note that it is possible that EXIM authorization in a given year translates into exports in the
following years for two reasons. First, because we measure EXIM support as total authorization, it
often takes more than one year (especially for longer-term loans) for all the authorized funds to be
disbursed for trade. Second, there may exist some time gap between the authorization and the actual
availability of funds for use (Egger and Url, 2006; Moser et al., 2008). Therefore, to test whether
EXIM authorization has an effect beyond the year of authorization, in columns 8-10 we introduce
lagged EXIM authorization variables which take into account EXIM authorization in both present
and past years. We find that the coefficient on the lagged EXIM authorization variable, whether
continuous or binary, stay insignificant. This implies that there are no detectable time lag effects of
EXIM authorization.
The above analysis consists of all industries which are treated equally in the regression. Nev-
ertheless, it is evident in Table 2 that aerospace parts and products (NAICS 3364) enjoys the lion’s
share in the EXIM’s financing portfolio, accounting for half of the Bank’s authorization. If for other
controlled factors this industry has a higher tendency of exports, it is then necessary to separate this
particular industry from others in estimation as the inclusion of it may lead to upward bias in the
EXIM effect. Consequently, estimates presented in Table 6 now show that EXIM authorization to
sectors other than aerospace parts and products has a significant but very small positive effect on US
export activities: we estimate an elasticity of 0.003 for the present-year effect (column 10), which
suggests that an increase in EXIM authorization by 10% creates additional exports by 0.03% in the
same year. If lags of EXIM authorization are accounted for, we find an increase in the magnitude
of EXIM authorization effect in the range of 0.006 (column 11), suggesting that a 10% expansion in
EXIM authorization generates a 0.06% increase in exports. To better grasp the economic meaning
of the magnitude, we compute average elasticity. Country-industry average of EXIM authorization
is about US$20.5 million and the average US exports is about US$74.3 million.30 Therefore, a 10%
increase in the average annual EXIM authorization, which is US$2.05 million (20.5 × 0.1), creates
additional exports of US$2.23 milion (74.3 × 0.03), which amounts to an economically relevant
multiplier of 2.23/2.05 = 1.09. A size of this multiplier means that every US$100 of EXIM au-
thorization to sectors other than aerospace products, creates US$109 of additional US exports from
these sectors as a whole. The size of this estimated multiplier is lower than those found for Germany
at 1.7 (Moser et al., 2008) and Austria at 2.8 (Egger and Url, 2006).
It should also be noted that: (a) lags of EXIM authorization beyond two years, do not have an
impact on US exports (column 12), and (b) the effect of EXIM authorization is greater for model
with lags (column 11) when compared to models with contemporaneous effect (column 10). As we
do not find evidence of export-promoting benefits arising from EXIM authorization to the aerospace
parts and products sector (columns 1-6), the remaining analysis focuses on other sectors.
30The figures used to calculate elasticities in this section are based on the real term values corresponding to the relevant
non-zero sub-samples in the dataset.
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6.2 EXIM financing to small businesses
We now proceed to disentangle the export-promoting effect of EXIM authorization across Amer-
ican companies of different sizes. This is particularly motivated by the rising debate around the need
to provide EXIM support for small exporting businesses and its potential impact on their exports.
Proponents, on the one hand, argue that the value of small businesses’ exports has grown markedly
in recent years because the Bank shoulders some of the risks of international deals and provides
private-market alternative financing. For instance, John Murphy, the senior vice president of the US
Chamber of Commerce, argues that buyers overseas increasingly expect vendors to offer financing.
In such a case, without the Bank, many US small businesses would be unable to extend terms to for-
eign buyers and would have to ask for cash-in-advance.31 Moreover, commercial banks often refuse
to accept foreign receivables as collateral for a loan without the Bank’s guarantee.32 Opponents,
on the other hand, argue that the significant growth of small businesses’ exports is unlikely to have
been driven by EXIM support as the vast majority of small businesses do not get any EXIM financial
assistance. For instance, according to USITC (2010), between 1997 and 2007 the value of exports
per small and medium-size business increased by 80%, yet the Bank supported only 0.04% of small
business establishments in 2007 (de Rugy, 2014).
Taking these contradictory observations to the data, and estimating eq. (5) for small and non-
small businesses groups, the estimates presented in columns 1-3 in Table 7 show that EXIM au-
thorization to small businesses does not have an impact on their exports. On the contrary, it is the
businesses that are not classified as small by the Bank that witness a positive impact of EXIM autho-
rization on their exports with an upto two-year lag.
These results suggest that EXIM authorization to small exporting businesses does not serve as
a strong engine for US exports. Although transactions for small business exporters increased from
85.6% of the total number of transactions in 2007 to nearly 90% in 2013, representing the highest
number ever for small businesses (US EXIM Bank, 2007, 2013a), our interpretation here is that
EXIM authorization to small businesses does not generate dollar value to the export kitty of the
US and EXIM support is not a lifeline to small businesses’ exports as claimed by the EXIM Bank
proponents.
To summarize, while the baseline results (Table 5) show that EXIM authorization does not have
a contemporaneous or lagged export-promoting effect, we do find that EXIM authorization to sectors
other than aerospace products has a positive effect on US exports (Table 6). Moreover, the positive
effect is mainly driven by the Bank’s authorization to American companies that are not classified as
small by the Bank (Table 7) .
6.3 Foreign ECA competition
A common argument around the EXIM Bank is that without its export financing, foreign compa-
nies would turn away from American goods and buy products from exporters whose countries offer
31http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/246347-the-arguments-for-ex-im-no-
one-can-rebut.
32http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/246347-the-arguments-for-ex-im-no-
one-can-rebut.
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Table 7. The effect of US EXIM financing to small businesses on US exports
Dependent variable: log value of US exports lnXUSjkt
(1) (2) (3)
EXIM small -0.000
(0.002)
EXIM other 0.005∗∗
(0.002)
EXIM small (past 2 yrs) 0.002
(0.003)
EXIM other (past 2 yrs) 0.006∗
(0.004)
EXIM small (past 3 yrs) -0.001
(0.004)
EXIM other (past 3 yrs) 0.005
(0.005)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 84,162 71,682 59,436
Adj. R2 0.851 0.857 0.863
Note. This table reports regression results on the effect of EXIM support extended to
small businesses on US exports. EXIM small is EXIM authorization to small businesses
and EXIM other is EXIM authorization to other businesses. Other variables are defined
as in Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Su-
perscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
ample export financing through its state ECAs. In other words, without US EXIM financing, Jet
Airways33 would not buy any Boeing aircrafts but would instead buy Bombardier aircrafts to benefit
from export financing provided by the Canadian ECA, Export Development Canada.
In situations where export financing is indeed provided by the US EXIM Bank, there is a pos-
sibility that foreign companies may still not purchase American goods and instead buy goods from
exporters whose countries are not regulated by the OECD Arrangement. This is because countries
who are not participants to the OECD arrangement are not obligated to comply with the OECD limi-
tations on the terms and conditions of export credit activity, and hence are able to provide for export
credit at flexible terms and conditions.40 If we add another aircraft exporting country, China, into
our example above, it would then imply that even if the US EXIM Bank, an ECA whose export
credit activity is regulated by the Arrangement, provides export financing to Jet Airways to purchase
Boeing aircraft, Jet Airways would probably opt to buy Chinese-made aircrafts as the export credit
activities of China are not regulated by the Arrangement and hence are more able to provide lenient
export credit terms and conditions to Jet Airways compared to what an Arrangement-regulated-US-
EXIM-Bank would have offered.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that American exporters, without EXIM authorization, could
have been at a disadvantage to foreign-ECA-financed-exporters, particularly to the ones that are
not regulated by the Arrangement. For instance, John Murphy, the senior vice president of the US
Chamber of Commerce, gives the example of a firm that sells US medical equipment in the Chinese
33Jet Airways is an Indian passenger carrier airline that travels on domestic and international routes.
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market who would not qualify to bid to do business in the Chinese health care system without the
US EXIM Bank.34 In a similar vein, the D.C. District Court found that, without US EXIM support
“airlines simply will purchase from Airbus instead of Boeing due to presence of foreign [export credit
agency financing]”.35
Even in situations where the US EXIM Bank actually provides export financing to support Amer-
ican exports, it is argued that the sheer volume of unregulated (by the Arrangement) ECA financing
could have put American exporters at a financing disadvantage in the global marketplace. This is only
evident in the fact that China, a non-Arrangement-compliant country, provided its exporters with at
least US$670 billion in ECA financing over a period of two years, while the US EXIM has equipped
American exporters with only about US$590 billion in financing over its entire 81-year history (US
EXIM Bank, 2015).36
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that, whether to counteract foreign export credit agency
competition, export financing provided by the US EXIM Bank may not have necessarily contributed
to US exports. This is because a large portion of export financing is drawn from sources other than the
US EXIM Bank. For instance, for the year 2013 and 2014, we estimate less than one-third of the esti-
mated export value, i.e. US$12.2 billion in 2013 and US$8.69 billion in 2014, of the Bank’s portfolio
being directed to counteract competitive disadvantages created by foreign governments’ ECA trade
financing activities.37 Besides, in 2013 (2014), only 15% (11%) of total large commercial aircraft
delivered by Boeing was “ECA supported” by the Bank while a whopping 48% (54%) was “ECA
eligible, but not supported” (US EXIM Bank, 2013a, 2014). In fact, in a ruling on the Delta versus
US EXIM Bank case, D.C. District Court asserts that EXIM financing is three times more expensive
than Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificate (EETCs), which are asset-backed bonds used by domes-
tic airlines to finance plane purchases.38 Even, between the participants to the OECD Arrangement,
ECAs have increasingly turned to tools outside of the Arrangement (e.g. market windows, untied
financing, and investment support) to finance projects abroad (US EXIM Bank, 2015).
Given these opposing anecdotal evidence, in this section we investigate this rising debate on
whether US EXIM authorization enables US exporters to compete with foreign exporters that receive
ample financing from their home-country ECAs. To do so, we use a number of measures to capture
the effect of the competition the US faces from exports supported by other countries’ ECAs. The first
measures is constructed as
34http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-pros-and-cons-of-reauthorizing-the-export-import-
bank/article/2551068.
35https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/costs-closing-ex-im-mount-house-vote-nears.
36According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the OECD Arrangement reportedly has saved US taxpayers
about US$800 million annually. The information can be accessed from the website of Office of United States Trade
Representative at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/oecd.
37The requirement to categorize all loans and long-term guarantees in its annual report came through in the reauthoriza-
tion of the US EXIM Bank in 2012. Therefore, we are able to calculate the estimated export value directed to meet foreign
ECA competition for the years 2013 and 2014.
38http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/246347-the-arguments-for-ex-im-no-
one-can-rebut.
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Gj,k,t =
N∑
c=1,
c6=US
Mj,k,c,t−1Ic,t−1, (10)
whereMj,k,c,t−1 is country j’s imports of good k from country c in year t−1, and Ic,t is a dummy that
takes on the value of one when country c has a government-backed export credit agencies. Table A2,
Appendix A, provides a list of countries with the names of their respective government-backed export
credit agencies.
The second measure takes further into account the similarity of the competing country’s export
structure to that of the US, based on the assumption that ceteris paribus when a country’s bundle
of exports to a market is more similar to the US exports in the same market, this country poses a
stronger competition to the US and thus creates additional incentive for the US EXIM to support its
exports to this market. Specifically, this measure takes the following form:
Gj,k,t =
N∑
c=1,
c 6=US
Mj,k,c,t−1Ic,t−1ESIUSc,t−1, (11)
where ESIUSc,t−1 is the export similarity index measuring the overlap of country c’s composition of
exports with that of the US, defined a la Finger and Kreinin (1979) as
ESIUSc,t−1 =
∑
k∈K
min(sk,c,t−1, sUSk,t−1). (12)
Here ESIUSc,t−1 varies between zero and one, with zero indicating completely different export struc-
ture and one representing identical export bundle to the US. Intuitively, (11) measures the competition
US product k faces in a foreign market j in year t from competing countries’ ECAs, weighted by
each country’s similarity to the US in export bundle. For the ease of interpretation of the variation,
both (10) and (11) are standardized so that they have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
The theoretical underpinning of the above two foreign competition measures is that a country’s
demand for foreign goods is intrinsic to the funds available to purchase this demand. Therefore, an
exporting country that has a government-backed ECA has a greater potential to influence an import-
ing country’s demand for US products, especially when the exporting country’s export structure is
similar to that of the US. In other words, both ECA support and export structure similarity to the US
would make an exporting country more of an competitor to US exports in the global market.39
39To put it simply, consider the following example. Supposing India has demands for aircrafts whose purchase depends
largely on the internal and external funds at its disposal. Assume that the demand for external funds is greater than the
available internal funds. While Indian buyers of aircraft can obtain the required funds from other sources of financing such
as equity and debt markets, countries of aircraft manufacturers, through their ECAs, can also provide the required funds
to the Indian buyer. Now suppose there are two countries that export aircrafts, the US which has a government backed
export credit agency, and Brazil which does not. If the US provides export financing through its ECA, Indian buyers are
more likely to make its aircrafts purchase from the US manufacturers than from the Brazilian counterparts irrespective of
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A look at the distributions of the two measures, (10) and (11), in Table 8 indicates that US exports
to the European region face maximum competition from ECA-financed exports by other countries,
and that the competition is stronger when the export bundles are more similar. On the contrary, it is
the Caribbean region where the US exports face the least competition from ECA-financed exports by
other countries. It should be noted that the relative ranking of the regions across the four measures is
stable.
For the regression analysis, we introduce the interaction terms between the foreign ECA competi-
tion measures (G as defined in (10) or (11)) and the US EXIM authorization variable, and re-estimate
eq. (5) on the country-industry-year sub-sample which includes all sectors other than aerospace prod-
ucts. From the results presented in columns 1-6 of Table 9, we see that the estimated coefficient of the
interaction terms between US EXIM authorization and measures of foreign ECA competition sway
between positive and negative values but remain invariably indifferent from zero in a statistical sense.
These results indicate that the export-promoting effect of US EXIM authorization is not affected by
foreign ECA competition, irrespective of which of the two foreign ECA competition measures we
use.
Given the landscape of international commitments under various international institutional ar-
rangements, competition for US exporters in the global marketplace may accentuate. In particular,
while ECA-related export credit activities of the participants to the Arrangement have to follow the
negotiated financing terms and conditions in the Arrangement, non-participants to the Arrangement
are not obligated to do so. We therefore proceed to investigate whether the mediating effect of
foreign ECA competition is influenced by competing countries’ accession to the OECD Arrange-
ment.40 In doing so, we further extend the above measures (13) and (14) by adding a multiplicative
item OECDc,t−1 which indicates whether exporter c is a signatory to the Arrangement in year t−1:
Gj,k,t =
N∑
c=1,
c6=US
Mj,k,c,t−1Ic,t−1OECDc,t−1, (13)
the similarity of Brazil’s exports and US exports to India, ceteris paribus. However, now consider a third country, Canada,
who also exports aircraft and has a government-backed ECA. In addition, in terms of the composition of goods, there is
more similarity between Canada’s exports and US exports to India than that between Brazil’s exports and US exports to
India. In such a case, Indian buyers are more likely to make their aircraft purchases from the two countries with ECAs, i.e.
US and Canada, ceteras paribus. Compared to Brazil, Canada is thus more of a competitor to the US in the Indian market.
40It should be noted that WTO members are also governed by WTO’s “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures” (SCM) which lists the conditions under which ECA financing provided by ECAs of WTO members shall
be considered as export subsidies. Although the clause in WTO’s SCM attempts to safeguard the interest of OECD
Arrangement-participants, the ambiguity in the clause leaves room for countries to maneuver such that ECAs from coun-
tries, not Arrangement-participants but WTO members, tend to indulge in providing financing (to its exporters) at terms
and conditions that are not viable by the Arrangement-participants. A case in point is the rising number of cases at the
WTO for dispute settlements on the violation of the clause on export credits in the WTO’s Agreement. One widely re-
ported example is Canada’s complaint at the WTO on Brazil violating the SCM Agreement; see the WTO webpage for
more details on this disputed case: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds46 e.htm. While
in principle both the Arrangement and SCM are binding regulatory frameworks for many competing countries of the US,
SCM has a much more universal coverage. To be precise, in our data virtually all (98.4%) of these competing countries’
exports (in dollar values) are destined for WTO members, of which only half (51.6%) land in OECD Arrangement coun-
tries. Therefore the OECD Arrangement effect we look at here captures the differential effect of the OECD Arrangement
relative to WTO export credit regulations, as part of the impact of foreign ECA competition on US exports.
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Gj,k,t =
N∑
c=1,
c 6=US
Mj,k,c,t−1Ic,t−1ESIUSc,t−1OECDc,t−1. (14)
Again, both (13) and (14) are standardized so that their mean is zero and standard deviation is one.41
The results are reported in Table 9. Columns 7-12 show that competing countries’ accession
to the Arrangement has no additional impact on ECA competition effect. This result suggests that,
ceteras paribus, US EXIM authorization has no effect on US exports to a market which is also sought
after by competing countries who are governed by the OECD Arrangement. This finding is broadly
consistent with the notion that the Arrangement ensures orderly and healthy competition between the
participating members of the Arrangement.
We then examine whether the mediating effect of foreign ECA competition is influenced by the
size of American companies who received funds from the US EXIM Bank. It is seen that EXIM
authorization to small businesses has gone up in the recent years (see the previous section), and yet
it is not clear whether support on small businesses creates more export opportunities as the Bank
claims (US EXIM Bank, 2007, 2013a). We see from columns 1-6 of Table 10 that in general EXIM
support, whether it is on small or larger companies, does not play a significant role in determining the
conditioning effect of foreign ECA competition. Columns 7-12 show that the differential effect of
the OECD Arrangement is mostly insignificant, except on one occasion (column 10) where the effect
is marginally significant at the 10% level and a one standard deviation increase in this competition
measure reduces the export effect of EXIM support by 0.1% when US exporters are competing
against ECA-supported exports from OECD countries with a similar export structure to the US.
To summarize, we find that, regardless of the degree of ECA-financed export competition which
US firms face in a foreign market, US EXIM Bank’s support does not promote US exports in a
detectable way. Besides, the size of American companies that receive the EXIM support or competing
countries accession to the Arrangement also does not determine the conditioning effect of foreign
ECA competition.
6.4 Industry upstreamness and cross-industry effects of EXIM authorization
Now we assess the effects of EXIM authorization in the context of US domestic value chains.
We first look at how EXIM authorization affects firms located in different sections of the value chain.
In theory it is not clear whether upstream sectors benefit more or less from EXIM finance than
downstream sectors. On the one hand, since upstream sectors rely heavily on the domestic market,
EXIM authorization on firms in these sectors may not benefit their exports as much as in downstream
sectors. On the other hand, if the US firms in US upstream sectors are also major upstream suppliers
in the global market (e.g. firms in the oil industry), EXIM authorization may boost their exports.
To have an empirical answer to the net effect, we interact EXIM authorization with a continuous
measure of the sector’s upstreamness in the US economy adopted from Antra`s et al. (2012). The
41The four measures of foreign ECA competition are highly correlated with each other, with the pairwise correlation
coefficient constantly above 0.77 and significant at the 1% level. See Table A3, Appendix A for the correlation matrix.
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results are presented in Table 11. The estimates from models of different time lags show that the
export-promoting effects of EXIM support are lower in sectors that are located more towards the
upper end of the value chain, but none of these interactions show statistically significance, suggesting
that the differences are indistinguishable.
Table 11. Industry heterogeneity - the role of industries’ positions in the value chain
Dependent variable: log value of US exports lnXUSjkt
(1) (2) (3)
EXIM support 0.008
(0.005)
EXIM support*Upstreamness -0.002
(0.003)
EXIM support (past 2 yrs) 0.008
(0.008)
EXIM support (past 2 yrs)*Upstreamness -0.001
(0.004)
EXIM support (past 3 yrs) 0.009
(0.010)
EXIM support (past 3 yrs)*Upstreamness -0.003
(0.005)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 84,162 71,682 59,436
Adj. R2 0.851 0.857 0.863
Note. This table reports regression results on how the effect of US EXIM support on US exports differs across
industries of different positions in the US value chain. Variables are defined as in Table 5. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels respectively.
Next we check the cross-industry spillover effect of EXIM authorization. Specifically, we are in-
terested in how EXIM authorization to firms in a given industry affects the exports of other industries
that are suppliers or buyers to this given industry. An underlying hypothesis is that EXIM support on
exports of intermediate inputs in upstream industries may fuel the growth of downstream industries in
other countries and thus creates additional competition to US downstream exporters. This possibility
suggests the necessity of checking the externality of EXIM authorization across industries.
To measure the spillover effect of EXIM authorization from other linked industries in the value
chain, we weight EXIM authorization in other industries by the cross-industry linkages constructed
from input-output coefficients.42 We use two measures to capture the spillover effect on a given
industry in the value chain, one through its links with upstream industries (supplying industries) and
the other through its links with downstream industries (demanding industries). The first takes the
form of
Upstreamkt ≡
M∑
q=1
αkqEXIMqt,
42Some other studies such as Javorcik (2004) and Amiti and Smarzynska Javorcik (2008) construct and apply cross-
industry linkages in a similar way albeit in different contexts.
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where αkq is the proportion of industry k’s total input that is supplied from industry q, and EXIMqt
is the total EXIM support in industry q in year t. The above measure captures the amount of linked
EXIM support in the upstream industries (supplying industries) of industry k in year t. The second
takes the form of
Downstreamkt ≡
M∑
q=1
βkqEXIMqt,
where βkq is the proportion of industry k’s total output that is supplied to industry q, and EXIMqt
is the total EXIM authorization in industry q in year t. This measure captures the amount of linked
EXIM authorization in the downstream industries (demanding industries) of industry k in year t. The
two parameters for the above cross-industry linkages, αkq and βkq, are from the US Input-Output
Table 2007.
Note that since the above cross-industry measures of EXIM authorization are only available at the
industry-year level, we now aggregate our data to the same level for regressions. Without previously
used control variables at a more disaggregated level, our regressions here only serve descriptive pur-
poses. The results, shown in Table 12, suggest that EXIM authorization has no statistically significant
impact both within and across industries.
Table 12. Spillover effect of EXIM authorization along the value chain
Dependent variable: log value of US exports lnXUSjkt
(1) (2) (3)
Within-industry EXIM support 0.001
(0.001)
Upstream EXIM support -0.006
(0.010)
Downsream EXIM support -0.001
(0.011)
Within-industry EXIM support (past 2 yrs) -0.001
(0.002)
Upstream EXIM support (past 2 yrs) -0.017
(0.015)
Downstream EXIM support (past 2 yrs) 0.002
(0.015)
Within-industry EXIM support (past 3 yrs) -0.001
(0.003)
Upstream EXIM support (past 3 yrs) -0.012
(0.019)
Downstream EXIM support (past 3 yrs) 0.004
(0.024)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 651 558 465
Adj. R2 0.990 0.994 0.995
Note. This table reports regression results on the effect US EXIM support spill over to other industries in the
US value chain. The dependent variable is the log value of US exports lnXUSjkt . The explanatory variables
are defined in the text of Section 6.4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level.
Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide evidence on the export-promoting effects of US EXIM Bank authoriza-
tion. We find that EXIM authorization does not affect US exports across all industries. In fact, it
is sectors other than that of aerospace parts and products (NAICS 3364) where EXIM authorization
has a positive and significant impact on US exports. Moreover, we find that it is those American
businesses that are not classified as small whose exports are more likely to benefit from EXIM au-
thorization. No export benefit from EXIM authorization to small American businesses is detectable.
We also find no evidence on whether financing provided by competing countries’ ECAs accentuates
competition for US exporters in the global marketplace. These results do not change qualitatively
when we control for competing exporters’ accession to the OECD Arrangement. When taking into
account inter-industrial links in the value chain, our results show that the above-found ineffectiveness
of EXIM authorization is insensitive to an industry’s position in the value chain, and also no evidence
affirms the existence of spillover effect of EXIM support across sectors.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature that studies the impact of ECA financing on
country exports. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that provides rigorous
empirical evidence in relation to the claims that the US EXIM Bank facilitates US exports through
its trade financing programs, and in doing so helps US exporters to counter government-backed
financing offered by foreign countries through their ECAs.
The findings in this study also provide important policy lessons for countries, especially lower
middle-income countries (e.g. Ghana) that are now in the inception stages of establishing their own
ECAs, and other countries (e.g. India and Thailand) that are placing ever more importance to ECA
financing in encouraging domestic exports. A possible avenue of future research which is in our
agenda is to have a cross-country study of the effect of ECA trade financing activities and investigate
the policy making process behind the establishment and running of ECAs across countries of different
political regimes.
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A Appendix
Table A1. Baseline results: alternative sample and regression method
Dependent variable (columns 1-3): value of US exports XUSjkt
Dependent variable (columns 4-6): log value of US exports lnXUSjkt
Poisson regressions,
Sample: whole sample
OLS,
Sample: EXIM support>0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EXIM support 0.002 0.014
(0.003) (0.016)
EXIM support (past 2 yrs) 0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.006)
EXIM support (past 3 yrs) 0.008 0.000
(0.008) (0.006)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 80,590 68,354 56,197 1,446 1,272 1,096
Adj. R2 0.966 0.978 0.989
Note. This table reports regression results using alternative regression method and data sample. Variables are defined as in
Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Table A2. List of official state export credit agencies across the world
Country State Export Credit Agency
Algeria Compagnie Algerienne D’Assurance et du Garantie des Exportation
Argentina Banco de Inversion y Comercio Exterior
Armenia Export Insurance Agency of America
Australia The Export Finance Insurance Corporation
Austria Oesterreichische Kontrollbank Aktiengesellschaft (OeKB)
Bangladesh Sadharan Bima Corporation Export Credit Guarantee Department
Barbados Central Bank of Barbados
Belarus Eximgarant of Belarus
Belgium Credendo Group
Belgium Delcredere - Ducroire
Bermuda Hiscox Political Risk
Bermuda Sovereign Risk Insurance Ltd (Sovereign)
Bosnia and Herzegovina Investment Guarantee Agency
Botswana Export Credit and Guarantee Company (BECI)
Brazil Agencia Brasileria Gestora Fundos Garantidores e Garantias S.A.
Brazil Banco National de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social - BNDES
Brazil Brazilian Export Credit Insurance Agency
Bulgaria Bulgarian Export Insurance Agency
Canada Export Development Canada
China China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (SINO SURE)
China Export Import Bank of China
(Continued on next page)
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Table A2. – List of export credit agencies (ECAs) across the world (continued)
Country State Export Credit Agency
Colombia Fondo Nacional de Garantias S.A. (FNG)
Colombia Banco de Comercio Exterior de Colombia (Bancoldex)
Croatia Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development (HBOR)
Cyprus Export Credit Insurance Service (ECIS)
Czech Republic Export Guarantee Insurance Corporation (EGAP)
Czech Republic Czech Export Bank, a.s.
Denmark Eksport Kredit Fonde
Egypt Export Credit Guarantee Company of Egypt (ECGE)
Estonia KredEx
Estonia KredEx Credit Insurance Ltd
Finland Finnvera Plc
Finland Finnish Export Credit Ltd (FEC)
France Compagnie Francaise d’ Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur (COFACE)∗
Germany Euler Hermes Deutschland (AG)
Germany PricewaterCoopers AG (PwC)
Germany Euler Hermes
Ghana Ghana Export Import Bank
Greece Export Credit Insurance Organization (ECIO)
Hong Kong Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance Corporation (HKEC)
Hungary Hungarian Export-Import Bank Plc
Hungary Hungarian Export Credit Insurance Plc
India Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd
India Export Import Bank of India
Indonesia Indonesian Eximbank
Indonesia PT. Asuransi Ekspor Indonesia (Persero) (Asuransi ASEI)
Iran Export Guarantee Fund of Iran
Ireland The Insurance Corporation of Ireland (ICI)
Israel Israel Export Insurance Corp Ltd (ASHRA)
Italy Servizi Assicurativi del Credito all’ Esportazione (SACE)
Italy Societa Italiana per le Imprese all’Estero (Simest SpA)
Jamaica National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica Limited
Japan Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI)
Japan Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Jordan Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC)
Kazakhstan KazExportGarant Export Credit Insurance Corporation (KAZEXPORTGARANT)
South Korea Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (KSURE)
South Korea The Export-Import Bank of Korea
Latvia Latvian Guarantee Agency (LGA)
Lebanon Lebanese Credit Insurer (LCI)
Lithuania INVEGA
Luxembourg Luxembourg Export Credit Agency (ODL)
Macedonia Macedonia Bank for Development Promotion
Malaysia Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Berhad
Malta Malta Export Credit Guarantee Company
Mexico Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior S.N.C. (BANCOMEXT)
Netherlands Altradius NV
New Zealand Export Credit Office (ECO)
(Continued on next page)
35
Table A2. – List of export credit agencies (ECAs) across the world (continued)
Country State Export Credit Agency
Nigeria Nigerian Export-Import Bank (NEXIM)
Norway Garanti-Instituttet for Eksportkreditt (GIEK)
Norway Export Credit Norway (Eksportkreditt Norge AS)
Oman Export Credit Guarantee Agency of Oman SAOC (ECGA Oman)
Philippines Philippine Export-Import Credit Agency
Poland Export Credit Insurance Corporation Joint Stock Company (KUKE)
Portugal Companhia de Seguro de Creditos, S.A. (COSEC)
Qatar Qatar Development Bank
Romania Exim Bank of Romania
Russia Export Insurance Agency of Russia
Saudi Arabia Saudi Export Program
Senegal Societe Nationale d’Assurances du Credit et du Cautionment
Serbia AOFI - Export Credit and Insurance Agency of the Republic of Serbia
Singapore ECICS Ltd
Slovak Republic Export-Import Bank of the Slovak Republic
Slovenia SID Inc, Ljubljana (SID)
South Africa Export Credit Insurance Corporation os South Africa
Spain Compania Espanola de Seguros de Credito a la Exportacion (CESCE)
Spain Secretaria de Estado de Comercio (Ministerio de Economia)
Spain Instituto de Credito Oficial (ICO)
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Export Credit Insurance Corporation (SLECIC)
Sudan National Agency for Insurance and Finance of Export of Sudan
Sweden Exportkreditnamnden
Sweden Svensk Exportkredit
Switzerland Swiss Export Risk Insurance (SERV)
Taiwan Taipei Export-Import Bank of China (TEBC)
Thailand Export Import Bank of Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago Export Import Bank of Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia Compagnie Tunisienne Pour L’Assurance Du Commerce Exterieur (CONTUNACE)
Turkey Export Credit Bank of Turkey
Ukraine The State Export Import Bank of Ukraine
UAE Export Credit Insurance Co. of the Emirates
UK Export Credit Guarantee Department (UK Export Finance)
USA Export Import Bank of the United States of America
Uruguay Banco de Seguros del Estado
Uzbekistan UZBEKINVEST National Export-Import Insurance Company
Vietnam Vietnam Development Bank
Zimbabwe Credit Insurance Zimbabwe Ltd (CREDSURE)
* On December 31, 2016, France’s COFACE transferred its export credit activities to Bpifrance As-
surance Export S.A.S. through the Amending Finance Law No. 2015-1786 dated December 29,
2015. See: https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/transfer-french-export-credit-activities-coface-bpifrance-
assurance-export-sas.
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Table A3. Correlation coefficients of foreign ECA competition measures
G=Σ M*I G=Σ M*I*ESI G=Σ M*I*OECD G=Σ M*I*ESI*OECD
G=Σ M*I 1.000
G=Σ M*I*ESI 0.940 1.000
(0.000)
G=Σ M*I*OECD 0.809 0.935 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
G=Σ M*I*ESI*OECD 0.774 0.924 0.990 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note. This table reports the correlation coefficients of the four measures of foreign ECA competition used in this research. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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